LAN Manager authentication level
Normally Windows 2000 and later authenticates users over the network using Kerberos but Windows will automatically fall back to the older, legacy NTLM authentication protocol whenever Kerberos fails including when:
User is logging on with a local SAM account instead of a domain account
The client and server are not in the same forest or not in forests connected by a cross-forest trust
One of the computers is pre-Windows 2000
NTLM is a challenge/response protocol where in the authenticating server or domain controller issues a challenge which the client authenticates using the password hash as a key. NTLM has been repeatedly patched over the years to address security vulnerabilities. The oldest Windows systems can only send back the LM response originally developed in the 80s for LanManager. With NT Microsoft developed a stronger hash and response mechanism called NTLM but continued supporting LM. Vulnerabilities were found in NTLM prompting NTLMv2. For more information on NTLM see “Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change”.
These patches affect connectivity to/from older versions of Windows and this setting allows you to tweak NTLM on this computer to be strict and less compatible with older systems or more compatible but less secure. Note that the values for this setting impact how the computer handles NTLM authentication both as a client and as the authenticating server. Microsoft documentation describes how this setting affects domain controllers but the correction terminology would be authenticating server since this setting impacts both domain controllers (when authenticating a domain account) and workstations and member servers (when authenticating a local SAM account). To control how Active Directory will handle NTLM configure this setting on your domain controllers using the Default Domain Controllers Policy GPO. To control how a workstation or member server will handle NTLM when authenticating local SAM accounts or – more often – when functioning as an NTLM client, configure this setting in an applicable group policy object that is applied to the desired computers.
NTLMv2 Session Security
Another issue impacted by this policy is NTLMv2 Session Security. Session security is a feature of the NTLN SSPI that allows applications to encrypt and/or sign communication between client and server after initial authentication is complete. Session keys are not used during the actual authentication sequence, but when an application requests security by calling the EncryptMessage or SignMessage APIs. NTLMv2 Session Security protects against certain man-in-the-middle attacks by improving how the session key is generated.
This setting has impact on 2 other settings “Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) clients” and “Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) servers”. If you require NTLMv2 Session Security in either of those settings but this setting is configured as level 0 or 1 and NTLMv2 Session Security negotiation fails, all communication via the NTLM SSPI will fail as well.
find more : network security lan manager authentication level
User is logging on with a local SAM account instead of a domain account
The client and server are not in the same forest or not in forests connected by a cross-forest trust
One of the computers is pre-Windows 2000
NTLM is a challenge/response protocol where in the authenticating server or domain controller issues a challenge which the client authenticates using the password hash as a key. NTLM has been repeatedly patched over the years to address security vulnerabilities. The oldest Windows systems can only send back the LM response originally developed in the 80s for LanManager. With NT Microsoft developed a stronger hash and response mechanism called NTLM but continued supporting LM. Vulnerabilities were found in NTLM prompting NTLMv2. For more information on NTLM see “Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change”.
These patches affect connectivity to/from older versions of Windows and this setting allows you to tweak NTLM on this computer to be strict and less compatible with older systems or more compatible but less secure. Note that the values for this setting impact how the computer handles NTLM authentication both as a client and as the authenticating server. Microsoft documentation describes how this setting affects domain controllers but the correction terminology would be authenticating server since this setting impacts both domain controllers (when authenticating a domain account) and workstations and member servers (when authenticating a local SAM account). To control how Active Directory will handle NTLM configure this setting on your domain controllers using the Default Domain Controllers Policy GPO. To control how a workstation or member server will handle NTLM when authenticating local SAM accounts or – more often – when functioning as an NTLM client, configure this setting in an applicable group policy object that is applied to the desired computers.
NTLMv2 Session Security
Another issue impacted by this policy is NTLMv2 Session Security. Session security is a feature of the NTLN SSPI that allows applications to encrypt and/or sign communication between client and server after initial authentication is complete. Session keys are not used during the actual authentication sequence, but when an application requests security by calling the EncryptMessage or SignMessage APIs. NTLMv2 Session Security protects against certain man-in-the-middle attacks by improving how the session key is generated.
This setting has impact on 2 other settings “Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) clients” and “Network security: Minimum session security for NTLM SSP based (including secure RPC) servers”. If you require NTLMv2 Session Security in either of those settings but this setting is configured as level 0 or 1 and NTLMv2 Session Security negotiation fails, all communication via the NTLM SSPI will fail as well.
find more : network security lan manager authentication level
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